Opinion Dynamics modeling has been based, so far, in models that seem reasonable descriptions of the way people interact and change their opinions. However, while it is true that the area has observed a few first successes in describing systems as elections, it still lacks a theoretical basis. No unifying principles have been suggested and the models, while ingenious, are typically proposed in an ad hoc basis. In this article, I propose to use a decision theoretic framework as a tool for describing the interaction between the agents in Opinion Dynamics problems. This idea of using Bayesian updating rules was presented before in the context of binary expression of choices, with a continuous underlying probability associated to each choice, the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) [1] model. The CODA model allowed the observation of emergence of extremism, even when no extremist agents were observed initially. It will be briefly reviewed here as an example of the application of Bayesian update rules.
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In order to study Bayesian updating rules as a basis for modeling the agents, those rules will be applied to agents who exchange continuous opinions about the value of a variable x [2]. The likelihood each agent assigns to hearing from another agent a specific value of x will be defined by a Gaussian term centered in his current opinion and a probability associated to an uniform distribution, representing the idea the other agent might have no idea about what he is talking about. This model will allow us to understand better what approximations to rational behavior are involved behind the rules of some of the standard current continuous models.
The effect of updating only a few moments of the distribution will be studied. A simple agent who updates only its average opinion will be shown to be produce results similar to those of the Bounded Confidence model. By also updating the uncertainty associated with that average value, the consequence will be the survival of several different opinions in the long run. These surviving opinions will be closer or more distant to each other, depending on the probability of error and initial uncertainty. Finally, the effect of the probability of error in the emergence of a network of agents who are able to influence each other will be discussed.
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